Freedom of the will - Edwards - VII - Part IV commenced

Required reading
Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards (available from Amazon or free here) - Commence Part IV by reading Section I to IV.

My summary
In Part IV Edwards continues to answer objections from Arminians.

Section I examines the argument that a man cannot be blamed for wickedness if he is caused to act wickedly - the cause alone is to blame.  Edwards answer is that both the cause and the person are to blame, as they are both sinning: 'It is true a cause may be to blame for being the cause of vice: it may be wickedness in the cause that it produces wickedness. But it would imply a contradiction, to suppose that these two are the same individual wickedness. The wicked act of the cause in producing wickedness, is one wickedness; and the wickedness produced, if there be any produced, is another. And therefore the wickedness of the latter does not lie in the former, but is distinct from it; and the wickedness of both lies in the evil nature of the things which are wicked.'

Section II looks at the Arminian definition of action.  Arminians claim that if we have no free will then there is only passivity, not action.  Edwards answers that their definition of action is incorrect and they contradict themselves as they claim that their mind is passive to their will and yet the mind is said to act: 'And yet they hold, that the mind’s action is the effect of its own determination; yea, the mind’s free and voluntary determination, which is the same with free choice. So that action is the effect of something preceding, even a preceding act of choice: and consequently, in this effect, the mind is passive, subject to the power and action of the preceding cause, which is the foregoing choice, and therefore cannot be active. So that here we have this contradiction, that action is always the effect of foregoing choice, and therefore cannot be action; because it is passive to the power of that preceding causal choice; and the mind cannot be active and passive in the same thing, at the same time. '

Section III and IV are connected.  Section III outlines the Arminian argument that common sense says if a man is forced to do something then we cannot praise or blame him.  Edwards rebuts this in Section IV by showing that common sense shows we still praise a man when he is forced to do something good and we still blame a man when he is forced to do something bad: 'Whereas the reverse is true: men do not think a good act to be the less praiseworthy for the agent’s being much determined in it by a good inclination or a good motive, but the more.'

What grabbed me
The argument that I liked a few sections ago came back again as a subpoint at the end of Section II: 'But, however strenuously it is maintained, that what is necessary cannot be properly called action, and that a necessary action is a contradiction, yet it is probable there are few Arminian divines, who, if thoroughly tried, would stand to these principles. They will allow, that God is, in the highest sense, an active being, and the highest fountain of life and action; and they would not probably deny, that those that are called God’s acts of righteousness, holiness, and faithfulness, are truly and properly God’s acts, and God is really a holy agent in them; and yet, I trust, they will not deny, that God necessarily acts justly and faithfully, and that it is impossible for Him to act unrighteously and unholy.'

Just because God is forced to be holy, that doesn't deny that his actions are holy.

Next week's reading
Continue Part IV by reading Section V to VIII.

Now it's your turn
Please post your own notes and thoughts in the comments section below.