Important Theological Controversies - Edwards - IX - Continue Chapter IV

Required reading

Remarks on Important Theological Controversies in Vol 2 of the Works by Jonathan Edwards (Available from Amazon or free here) - Continue Chapter IV 'Concerning Efficacious Grace' by reading up to the paragraph commencing '53. If God is not the disposing of virtue, then he is not the giver of it.'

My summary

We continue hearing about efficacious grace including:

(i) command and manifestation of will are not the same thing;

(ii) Arminian objections;

(iii) regeneration;

(iv) irresistible grace;

(v) efficacious grace is decisive;

(vi) the nature of virtue.

What grabbed me

I liked Edwards reasoning here: 'Instead of persons being the determining and efficient causes of their own virtue and piety, after all the moral means God uses with man, let us suppose some third person between God and the subject of this gift of virtue, to be in the very same manner the sovereignty determining cause and efficient of virtue; that he had power to bestow it on us, or cause us to be the subjects of it, just in the same manner as the Arminians suppose we ourselves have power to be the causes of our being the subjects of virtue; and that it depended on this third person’s free will, just in the same manner as now they suppose our having virtue depends on our own free will; and that God used moral means with that third person to bestow virtue on us, just in the same manner that he used moral means to persuade us to cause virtue in ourselves, and the moral means had the like tendency to operate on his will as on ours; but finally, it was left entirely to his free will to be the sole determining cause whether we should have virtue, without any such influence on his will as in the least to insure his sovereignty, and arbitrary disposal, and perfectly free self-determination; and it should be left contingent, whether he would bestow it or not; and, in these circumstances, this third person should happen to determine in our favour, and bestow virtue: now I ask, would it be proper to ascribe the matter so wholly to God, in such strong terms, and in such a great variety; to ascribe it so entirely to him as his gift; to pray to him beforehand for it; to give him thanks, to give him all the glory, &c.? On the contrary, would not this determining cause, whose arbitrary, self-determined, self-possessed, sovereign will, decides the matter, be properly looked upon as the main cause, vastly the most proper cause, the truest author and bestower of the benefit? Would not he be, as it were, all in the cause? Would not the glory properly belong to him, on whose pleasure the determination of the matter properly depended?'

Yes, yes it would!

Next week's reading

Continue Chapter IV 'Concerning Efficacious Grace' by reading up to the paragraph commencing '77. If the grace of God is not disposing and determining...'

Now it's your turn

Please post your own notes and thoughts in the comments section below.